OFFI IAL DISPATO SPIRCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3821

VIENNA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ASENCY NAZI WAR CRIMES DI SCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY

DISPATCH NO .: NAVA 2239-

CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 16 December 1948

TO

: Chief, Foreign Branch H

Attention: C

FROM

: Chief of Station, Vienna

SUBJECT: General: Operational Specific: Temberg

HAY-W-817

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I is permanent home is in Vienna and it has always been our intention that he operate in or near this area, not from Salzburg as you have indicated in paragraph two of your reference dispatch. A sheek with I has confirmed our first impression that the Obst signal plan was dosigned for transmission between the Tienna area and Limber base, and we are again in a position to request authorisation for immediate issuance of the Obst □. In the future the □ project will be referred to as Icoberg Baker, signal plan Obst, as suggested by w - during his recent visit here. Other Iceberg references will be assigned as eperators are trained and introduced to their cached sets.

- 2. Due to radical changes made in the or Fredeet within the past few weeks, we believe that it would be inadvisable to attempt to link the remainder of the = 3 sources with = 3. As a general rule, with the exception of projects which we have every reason to believe will retain their security on a stay-behind basis, we think it the best policy to isolate operators from sources until direcustances force us to bring them together. We are working on the problem of planning somere contacts between agents and operators at the enthroak of hostilities through prearranged "blind" meetings, letter drops, or, if proper coordination can be arranged, by giving the operators by radio from the base, instructions on how to make contact with various agents.
- 3. The attached memorandum (VSM/OGM/102 to Salaburg) is a further prograssion along the lines of MAVA-1665, and was the outcome of discussions with I during which it become evident that any plans for a new base station to replace Linber would have to take into consideration the possibility that, in the face of Seriet pressure, the Vestern powers might not be able to held an area within a range of 1000 to 1500 miles to the South of Austria. In that event, and if a base station were to be erected considerably further to the south, our present SSTR-1 equipment could not be expected to operate efficiently ever the increased range with any degree of certainty.

INDEE: ABSTRACT

(Spy. Jackey) CS-6-6-199 Ju-66-850/67 By 10 FOLD/

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CS CAPY

- 4. From the long enge security standpoint, there are very definite objections to connecting agent groups by courier with a larger, central transmin the Alpine region. Such a system of functing numerous agent groups through a single transmitter would involve setting up a large and complicated courier system over considerable distances and through counter-security controls, transportation diffigulties, read blocks and so forth which cannot now be assessed. It would also mean a considerable time-lag between the gathering of information and its transmission to the base station.
- 5. Aside from altering present agent equipment, and presumably increasing its bulk to the point where it would be difficult to censeal in a demanly populated and tightly controlled area, another alternative would be the establishment of higher powered stations in the mountainous areas of Austria, Switzeniand, Italy, France or Spain, which could pick up and relay transmissions from submidinate stations in Europe to whatever base might be chosen. Some of the advantages in using such a system would be increased range, speed in transmission of reports, and the immediate issuance of usable signal plans to the individual field station operator once the position of the relay station is determined, even though the location of the base station itself may not yet have been established.
- stations from detection and neutralization. Operators who are well trained in partisen operations and evasion in mountain territory should have a fair chance of survival, particularly since operating a relay station, they would be spaced direct physical centact with Agent groups, thus minimising the possibility of expessing the whole system through comprenise of any one group. The development of tape transmission equipment would shorten the length of transmission between relay and base stations and render EF operations difficult if not impossible. We understood, however, that tape transmission is still in the planning stage and say hase station would presumably have sufficient power to transmit directly to subordinate stations, it might be advisable to limit centact from subordinate stations to the relay station to FOK missions, thus reducing relay station transmission by more than half.
- 7. It is, of course, impossible for us to assess the technical difficulties which would arise from the use of procedures such as these mentioned above. Once a relay site is chosen, we presume that an initial neve would be the insusance of special signal plans for relay work to the substitute station operators to alternate listening frequencies on which they could pick up operating instructions from a transmitter in the U.S. operating a FOX schedule. This plan is suggested only for the initial instructions regarding setting up of operating procedures, prior to the establishment of a base station in Europe or Napital Africa, in case events everybell us before the approved precedures and pagmanguit base station can be established. The security dangers of prelanged two-way traffic between subordinate stations and the relay station are obvious.

8. Our action thus far has been limited to the attached mone to Salaburg. If I and I I are undertaking a survey of the area in questia, but it must be anticipated that winter weather will hamper their efforts, particularly in the mountain regions, and that it may be spring before the results are such that we can make more specific proposals. In the meantime we would appreciate your comments and your technical advice on the type of equipment which could be used, choice of transmission sites, and any changes which would have to be made in our present equipment and training setup.

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
MLMORANDUM

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NO.: VSM/OCM/102

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FROM	;	E		J (Th	mai C.	MUSOG I	KBE IN	
SUBJECT	;	Gashing of	Long	_	Radio Remipment	D DE	CLASSIFIED TO TO TO REVIEW BATES	¢
REF	:	MAYA-1597,	1668	, 1669,		HEXT AUTH: Date:	HU TO TOO.	

- 1. Recent discussions concerning technical problems in the star-behind radio pregram have increased our interest in caching radio equipment with a runge considerably greater than is possible with present agent equipment. The best area for this would be somewhere in the Tyrol region.
 - 2. Your problem will be to develop:
 - a. one or more secure and technically suitable spets for transmission and chahing of the equipment and
 - b. one or two operators.
- 3. The areas chesen for operation of the set must face toward the south, a southern slope of a mountain, for example, and have no mountains or other physical obstructions of any magnitude within a radius of three miles in that direction. To hinder detection by M' units and subsequent neutralization of the set, the area should probably be remote and innecessible with facilities for quick concelement of the equipment and getaway of the operators. The authoment which we have in mind will have a packed volume of 2x2x2 feet and weigh appreximately 500 yeards. For easier transportation it can be busines down into three or four carrying leads some of which, however, will still be too heavy to be carried for any distance by a single man.
- 4. The operators will be comewhat more highly trained than them developed for direct eperations with SETR 1's and must therefore be placed from the best material symilable. They should have had no connections whatseever with other agents or prejects of this organization and no adverse political affiliations er other factors which would affect their assured security as \$tay behinds. It might be necessary for the everators of this set to go on a partition besits when the time comes to begin transmission, and warting experience in partisan waits would be an additional qualification.
- S. It should be emphasized that this project is to be connected in me way with your C _ organization.



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TO